It is difficult not to agree wholeheartedly with Franklin Fisher's main contention (Fisher (1987» that equating the welfare of two consumers because they are on the same indifference curve of identical utility functions is a normative statement. His point that the use of household equivalence scales in welfare analysis does involve a value judgement is well taken. This should have sufficed. He does however attempt to sway his audience with a comparison of milk-hungry children and whisky-swilling swingers; it backfires.
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Fisher considers a three-commodity world with milk, whisky and "other goods" being numbered 1,2 and 3 respectively. There are two families, both with the same income M; one family is large and the other is small. The household equivalence scales are normalized by setting them equal to one for each commodity for the small family. It has the indirect utility function
The large family has the indirect utility function
and faces prices pf , pI and pI. Equation (1) reflects the direct utility function while equation (2) corresponds to
The assumption made by Fisher is
, the values of the two utility functions are the same and, under the above value judgement, this means that the two families are equally well off. Fisher claims (p. 521) that if the prices faced by the two families are such that p~= Pnmn(L), n = 1,2,3,
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"then the value judgement in question requires us to call the two families equally well off, despite the fact that the large family faces a very high price for milk and a low one for whisky". He then argues that this conclusion is "ethically repugnant". However the claim that (6) ensures equal levels of utilities for the two families is incorrect under assumption (5). Inspection of (1) and (2) reveals that a sufficient condition for the values of all arguments of (1) and (2) to be identical is n = 1,2,3,
just the opposite of Fisher's claim. Then the two families certainly reach the same utility level and the large family faces a lower milk price and a higher whisky price relative to the small family. The claim that both families are thus equally well off does involve a value judgment but not one which would be "ethically repugnant" to most.
It is instructive to look upon the scaling as reflecting different "household production functions". Under assumption (5) the large family is a relatively inefficient user of milk and a relatively efficient user of whisky. Having it face a lower milk price and a higher whisky price simply compensates for these characteristics and enables it to reach the same level of utility-without prejudice as to the welfare implications of this result.
The reason why this slip might have gone unnoticed is that the hypothetical case raised by Fisher cannot entirely be ruled out. If we follow his price relationship (6) the small family's level of utility is given by (1) and the large family's by
The first argument in (8) is much larger than that in (1) and the second argument much lower, hence for appropriate values of the parameters the level of utility might be the same in both cases. However this is only the result of substitution between the first two commodities. Presumably even a large family can be compensated for a higher milk price by a lower whisky price; certainly household equivalence scales do not dictate that the result must be achieved thus, as demonstrated above. A way of ensuring that the large family faces a higher milk price and a lower whisky price under (7) was suggested by Professor Fisher.\ It consists of reversing assumption (5) 
This seems an odd way to model the large family's desire for milk. To paraphrase Fisher (p, 520, last line), larger households require less milk and more whisky to get on the same indifference curve as small ones. Assumption (9) makes the large family an "efficient user of milk" which is able to derive the same "milk enjoyment" by sharing a cup of milk among parents and children as does the small family by drinking a pint per person. I find this premise unrealistic in the way it models the effect of size on a family's taste for milk.
Finally it must be observed that neither (5) nor (9) can guarantee that the demand for milk by the large family exceeds that of the small family as we now demonstrate by an example. (9) with an appropriate choice of parameters. For instance under (9), 'Yt < 0 and a" P2, 'Y2 and miL) large enough, we have x.i L) < x\(S). This observation can be used as a warning on an over-reliance on household equivalence scales because it shows that the scaling, up or down, of some commodity does not guarantee increased demand for it, even in a form as rigid as LES, because the scales interact with many other parameters.
There is a further, more insightful comment in another of Fisher's examples, which shows the limitations of static demand theory. Fisher notes that the tastes of an individual or a household are partly formed from experience. This is particularly true of some of the arguments of the household equivalence scales such as family size, geographical location, choice of occupation and the like. Attention to the choice of these attributes by households might be a more fruitful area of research.
In conclusion, welfare comparisons based on the utility levels of different households do involve a value judgement but the use of household equivalence scales is not the cause of this. These and other issues are addressed in Pollak and Wales (1979) .
